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Abstract 
This article investigates the extent to which European identity has emerged in Europe, employing a 
cross-national comparison. The results of this quantitative analysis (multilevel regression analysis on 
Eurobarometer survey data) will subsequently be complemented with results from a qualitative inquiry 
among Polish higher educated youth, which was held in the framework of the same research project. 
The author argues that national and European political identifications are by no means mutually 
exclusive. In exploring the relation between both kinds of identity, individual and national 
characteristics are taken into account, and it is argued that mixed methods research designs offer a 
promising approach to the study of collective identities. 




Walking through Warsaw in December 2007, a quote on a billboard caught my attention: 
We reject the notion of losing our sovereignty [...], we also reject the idea of a federal super-state 
[...]. We reject the idea of European citizenship [...]. We want to keep our frontiers [...]. Once 
inside the EU, within a few years we will have been radically bought out and deprived of our 
national identity. — (Barski & Lipkowski, 1996) 
This excerpt is a clear example of the political rhetoric that is very commonly used all over Europe by 
people opposing European integration. Becoming more ‘European’ is held to be synonymous with 
becoming less ‘national’, instrumentally utilizing a dichotomy in both space and time. It is an 
incarnation of the ‘tradition’ (or backwardness) versus ‘modernity’ (or progress) dichotomy of sorts. 
In public debate the European Union is often depicted as an undemocratic, cumbersome 
institution, threatening the sovereignty and identity1 of the nation-states within. “[M]any groups of 
people among the member nations perceive the EU as a political organization which diminishes national 
state sovereignty, and [these groups] resist the EU’s efforts at the creation of a ‘European identity’ as 
directly at odds with their own, superordinate national identities” (Wilson, 1996, p. 208). This perceived 
threat does not only exist in politics, but has also been shown to be present in the media and society at 
large in several empirical studies (see, for example Lubbers, 2008; Van Os, 2008). The Dutch and French 
referenda in 2005 rejecting the proposed European constitution2, and the rejection of the revised 
constitutional treaty in Ireland in 2008 are still vividly present in Europe’s recent political memory. In 
addition, extreme-right wing politicians in various countries in Europe have thrived, simply by evoking 
these images of ‘Europe’, urging people to ‘stand up’ for their country’s independence (see also 
McGuinness, 1996, pp. 64-79). 
 And yet, in contrast to what these outcomes might seem to suggest, “[s]upport for membership 
of the European Union is at its highest in over a decade” (European Commission, 2007b, p. 22). In the 
European Commission’s most recent Eurobarometer report3, on average 58% of all European citizens 
support their country’s EU membership, and there are no countries where support falls behind of 
opposition4 (ibid.). Paradoxically, countries that may seem most eurosceptic in political discourse and 
media coverage often actually show the highest levels of public support. France and the Netherlands are 
notoriously remembered for rejecting the proposed constitution, but both have levels of public support 
comfortably above the EU average. The Netherlands even ranks second (79%) of all European nations. 
For Poland, recently portrayed as a new-found eurosceptic nation because of political debacles over 
various European issues (BBC News, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Kropiwnicki, 2007; Morris, 2004; 
Repa, 2006), the Eurobarometer report shows similarly high support (71%). 
 Where does this ambiguity come from? Certainly, “many groups of people” perceive the EU as a 
threat (Wilson, 1996, p. 208), but which groups of people do and do not feel this way exactly? Why do 
they perceive this threat, and precisely how do they construct their national and, perhaps, European 
identities? Is ‘Europe’ only perceived to be a threat to national sovereignty or are people’s opinions and 
attitudes not that consistent after all? In a rapidly evolving Europe these questions call for extensive 
and thorough answers. Providing these answers systematically requires a specific methodology, 
combining the width of quantitative research and the strategic depth of qualitative inquiry reality (see 
Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, for a discussion on mixed methods research questions). 
In this paper, I will not elaborate in detail on the ‘top-down’ elite constructions of ‘Europe’ and 
its identity, as has been done by Shore (2000). Neither will my focal point be to analyze symbolic and 
political / ‘official’ representations of Europe or the nation-state (cf. McNeill, 2004). What I will 
3 
 
concentrate on in this paper, is identification with Europe, and can actually be divided into two aspects. 
First, as McNeill points out: “[...] Europeanization may be simultaneously welcomed and fiercely resisted 
by different groups in the same national society” (2004, p. 37). I would like to add to this statement that 
Europeanization does not only meet ambiguous evaluations by different groups in the same nation, but 
that it may also be evaluated differently by the same groups in various contexts, and with regard to 
specific topics. Therefore, I will analyse to which extent ‘European identification’ exists, and according 
to which individual and national determinants it is distributed across the European Union. This will be 
achieved through the quantitative multilevel analysis of Eurobarometer data. 
Second, in order to understand which social constructions of Europe and the nation-state 
underlie these ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical attitudes, it is necessary to comprehend what 
being or feeling ‘European’ actually means to the people expressing such feelings. This is therefore the 
second aspect of identification with Europe that is examined, which will be based on qualitative in-
depth data gathered between October 2007 and February 2008 among Polish higher educated youth. 
Below, I will first elaborate on the relevance of finding an adequate answer to the above 
questions. After that, I will provide a theoretical framework that is most heavily grounded in sociology 
and social/cultural anthropology, but extensively borrows from human geography and political sciences. 
After my theoretical point of departure has been made clear, I will proceed to presenting my empirical 
findings (quantitative and qualitative), my analyses, and a conclusion. 
Identification with Europe: why should we care? 
There are several reasons why European identification is a highly relevant topic. Politically, the 
legitimacy of the European project may be at stake. It is often claimed that the citizens of the European 
Union have had little say in major political changes made in their name (i.e. the ‘democratic deficit’), and 
that one of the most prominent issues of the EU is that its institutions lack accountability (Carey, 2002, 
p. 388).5 In addition, as Carey (2002, p. 388) also points out, the European Commission published a 
white paper in 2001 which emphasized the strengthening of a “European identity and the importance of 
shared values within the Union” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 27) in an effort 
to strengthen the EU’s ties with its citizens and thus improve its democratic legitimacy (see also 
McNeill, 2004, pp. 13-14; Sassatelli, 2002; Shore, 2000).6 
Even though documents such as these show that the EU aims to strengthen ties with its 
citizens through what may be called the construction of European identity, questions on how these 
citizens make ‘Europe’ part of their social reality and discourse remain insufficiently investigated. With 
regard to theory, one could safely say that ‘European identity’ has been the subject of extensive research, 
but in very diverse ways. In my view, if we are to properly grasp European identity, we should not 
approach identification with Europe as necessarily conflicting with national identification. Underlying 
this misconception is the dubious assumption that if there is such a thing as European identity, then 
‘Europe’ must be becoming a nation-state writ large (see Delanty, 2006; Risse, 2001; Risse, 2003, for a 
discussion). If we are to find and understand European identity, we should not let ourselves be misled 
too much by concepts and theories based on nation-state identifications. Looked at from this angle, the 
potential emergence of a European identity may provide us with the exciting opportunity to witness the 
birth a ‘new kind’ of identification that may well shape our social reality in the decades to come. 
The Europeanization of collective identities 
Europe is ‘Europeanizing’. Economically, but also politically and even socially, the nation-states on the 
European continent are growing closer together. This changes the way we think about what a nation-
state is, and what ‘national identity’ entails. It makes us wonder what ‘Europe’ is, what it means to be 
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‘European’, and whether there is such a thing as ‘European identity’. It also fires up discussions about 
where the ‘boundaries of Europe’ are, and who is distinctly ‘different’ than ‘us’. Europe’s citizens will 
have to incorporate all of these questions into their social reality. The fundamental concept by which 
social, economic, political and cultural life in Europe (and beyond) has been organized for most of the 
last century has been the nation-state (McNeill, 2004, p. 36; Murray, 1998, p. 43). According to some, 
this dominance is under threat by European supranationalism. 
In popular and even academic debate, national identity is often imagined to be at odds with 
European integration, and ceding responsibilities to ‘Brussels’ instead of (or in addition to) the national 
governments is equated with losing national independence. Politically, this rhetoric sometimes goes as 
far as equating all that is politically or culturally ‘wrong’ within a country with ‘Brussels’ and all that is 
‘good’ with the national government or culture. Most often this is used by populist and/or eurosceptic 
political actors (see also Rupnik, 2007). However, even outside of the populist realm, such a politicized 
representation of reality has been expressed regularly (see Mau, 2005, p. 308). 
 Are we witnessing the political and social death of the nation-state in Europe as a result of 
European integration? I do not believe we are. The nation-state not only remains the primary unit of 
Western societal organization; it also continues to shape collective identities to an extent that is not 
likely to be overshadowed by any form of European identification in the foreseeable future (see 
Calhoun, 2007, chapter two; McNeill, 2004, p. 36). “Globalization challenges nation-states and 
intensifies flows across their borders, but it doesn’t automatically make them matter less” (Calhoun, 
2007, p. 9). The same can be said about Europe; even though social, cultural, economical and political 
cross-border flows intensify, this affects the imagination of the nation-states and of Europe; how they are 
socially constructed, not their legitimacy or even their existence.  
 McNeill (2004, p. 36) and others maintain that the debate on European political (and 
territorial) organization and identification is often excessively simplistic, and I concur. If we focus our 
attention on matters of social constructions and collective identification (instead of on economy and 
politics, for example), we would most likely conclude that European integration will not replace national 
identities. However, neither will European sociocultural, political, and economic integration be without 
any social consequences whatsoever. As with many things, matters are far more complex. 
European identity 
Previous work on European identity has taken on various perspectives to empirically capture it. The 
theoretical starting point is often identification with the nation-state. There already exists an impressive 
array of literature on how people identify with their nations, so simply adapting this work to a European 
level is certainly tempting. Crucial to this approach, is that identification as a process always requires a 
significant Other for subsequent self-definition (see, among many others, Barth, 1969; Blok, 2000; De 
Swaan, 2001; Erikson, 1968; Jenkins, 2004). In order to apply nationalism theories on Europeanization, 
we should therefore define who or what Europe’s Others are. For nation-states, these significant Others 
have traditionally been other nation-states. The most obvious Others for an emerging European 
identity that are most commonly suggested are the United States, Russia7, and more recently Islam 
and/or the Middle East (see Adamson, 2004; Balch, 2005; Benthall, 2004; Grillo, 2004; Strasser, 2008). 
Others have proposed that Eastern and Western Europe can be seen as each other’s Others (cf. Kuus, 
2004). An interesting perspective that is also regularly put forward is that European nation-states are 
socially constructed partly in opposition to Europe, and vice versa; Europe in opposition to nationalities 
(cf. Carey, 2002). 
This last perspective in particular, joins together nicely with much of the public debate 
surrounding Europeanization that I illustrated earlier. If a power-struggle between national and 
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European identifications indeed is the case, it would be simple enough to determine which people 
identify themselves with Europe. When asked8 in October/November 2005 whether they expect to feel 
citizens of their country and/or of Europe in the near future, 89% of all respondents still had a 
preference for their nationality9, while only 9% preferred to place feeling European over feeling 
national10 (European Commission, 2006, p. 45). On the other hand, 55% of the people in the same 
survey occasionally thought of themselves “not only as nationality, but also European”, and 63% even 
felt “proud to be European”11. 
Based on these figures, it seems that we should not conceptualize a potential identification with 
Europe as necessarily being mutually exclusive with nation-state identity. Many have argued for 
studying Europeanization as an entirely new form of social organization (Borneman & Fowler, 1997), 
and some have even suggested positive correlations between nation-state and European identifications 
(Bruter, 2003, p. 1154, see also; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; McLaren, 2002, 2004). In fact, as 
Hutchinson argues, “ [...] many, if not most, European national identities have been developed either 
alongside or in relation to a sense of Europeanness [...]” (2003, p. 37). So, instead of looking at 
Europeanization as the inevitable demise of the European nation-state, we should focus on the “more 
complex political process of repositioning, remapping, and rebranding of the nation-state” (McNeill, 
2004, pp. 36-37), in order to understand European identity. 
Civic and cultural European identity 
In two inspiring articles, Michael Bruter (2003, 2004) discusses citizens’ perceptions of news, symbols 
and “borderless-ness” with regard to their identification with Europe. In his analyses, he makes a very 
useful distinction between a ‘civic’ and a ‘cultural’ component of European political identity. By civic 
identity, Bruter means “the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political 
system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life” (2003, p. 1155). As he himself 
also notices, this component of identity is quite close to Habermas’s “constitutional patriotism” (1992). 
Cultural identity, on the other hand, refers to the perceived level of sameness with other Europeans. 
Bruter defines it as “individuals’ perception that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-
Europeans [...] regardless of the nature of the political system” (2003, pp. 1155-1156). 
Bruter further argues that what is most often pursued both theoretically and empirically in 
academic literature dealing with the emergence of European identification, is actually only the civic 
component (2003, pp. 1167-1171; see also Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2008, paragraph 2.3). Also, a 
central conclusion that Bruter proposes is that, while the civic component appeals to citizens’ reason to 
a larger extent, the cultural component is more substantially driven by collective symbols and images of 
Europe (ibid.). The answer to the question which specific features are thought of by citizens as 
‘European’ with regard to cultural European identity, however, is very likely to vary across countries, 
regions, and even individuals. For some, what binds Europeans may be an ideal of peace and openness, 
while for others, it may be Europe’s ‘Christian heritage’. Bruter acknowledges this too, and examines 
these differences in a qualitative comparison of focus groups run in France, the UK, and the 
Netherlands (Bruter, 2004). His most interesting findings with regard to the aims of my own study are 
that the members12 of his focus groups expressed an image of Europe that emanates peacefulness, 
prosperity, co-operation, harmony, and educational and cultural initiatives (Bruter, 2004, pp. 28, 30).  
In order to make clear his distinction between civic and cultural political identities, Bruter asked 
his respondents whether, in their view, “[...] European identity and being ‘for’ Europe were the same 
thing” (2004, p. 34). None of the participants in the focus groups agreed to this proposition. They 
clearly differentiated between “support for a project”, Bruter’s civic identity, and “the emergence of a 
new identity”, the cultural dimension (ibid.). Perhaps it would have been more useful for Bruter’s 
argument at this point to more clearly distinguish between ‘Europe’ and the EU. On the other hand, 
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such a differentiation might not be that salient in the minds of his respondents in the first place. One 
could argue that in this way, the EU’s policies in this field are shaping an identity that stretches further 
than its territorial limits. 
When it comes to defining European identity, Bruter finds two sets of descriptions among his 
respondents. Some define it in a similar fashion as they would have described their national identity, 
referring to a sense of being in the same society, regardless of local differences. This definition seems 
best compatible with Bruter’s civic political identity. Others described feeling European because of 
certain values like cross-national/cultural mixing, cosmopolitanism, and, again, co-operation. This type, 
of course, concurs with the cultural political identity component. According to Bruter, respondents were 
divided on “[...] whether Europe is an anti-national or a meta-national construct [...] as much as it 
divides political scientists” (2004, p. 34). 
Data and methods 
In my empirical analyses, I will take Bruter’s distinction between a civic and a cultural component of 
European identification as my main point of departure. I will first quantitatively compare all current EU 
member states on a measurement of identification with Europe. Second, I will provide the results of a 
more in-depth, qualitative analysis of the social process that is European identification.13 This has the 
advantage that it enables us to understand the underlying social imaginings of Europe and the nation-
state. For this second purpose, I have chosen one very specific, but highly relevant group of people: 
Polish higher educated youth. I decided to analyze this group based on a number of arguments, which 
could methodologically be summarized as ‘critical case sampling’ or ‘theoretical sampling’ (Teddlie & Yu, 
2007, pp. 80-83). This purposive sampling strategy complements the probability sampling approach of 
the quantitative research style, grounding the overall project in a ‘sequential mixed methods sampling’ 
approach (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, pp. 90-91). See Appendix I for an overview of the complete mixed 
methods research process. Below, I will first discuss the quantitative data and scales, which relate to the 
European Union as a whole. After that, I will provide my arguments for focusing on Polish higher 
educated youth. 
Quantitative data and measurements 
The quantitative analyses provided in this paper are based on the Eurobarometer series data, gathered 
quite regularly by the European Commission.14 The survey is conducted two to five times per year, and 
consists of approximately 1,000 respondents per EU member state15. The most significant limitation of 
the Eurobarometer studies, and many other measurements that have not been tailored to meet the 
requirements of a specific project, is that it does not provide a direct measurement of the dependent 
variable. European identity can therefore only be traced using an indirect measure. 
 For this purpose, I have constructed two scales measuring European identity. The first one is 
very similar to the one used by Bruter (2005a, p. 198) and Lubber & Scheepers (2005), and indeed 
measures European civic identification with the EU. This enables me to build on the validity of the 
measure already established by these prior studies.  In the construction of this first scale, the question 
whether the respondent’s country has benefited from EU membership was recoded to range from zero 
to one (the country has benefited (1) or has not (0)). Similarly, the question whether it is a good or a bad 
thing that the respondent’s country is a member of the EU ranged from one to three, but was recoded to 
range from zero (a bad thing) to one (a good thing). Respondents who answered that it is ‘neither good 
nor bad’ were given the value 0.5 (cf. Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, p. 240). For both variables in this 
scale, people who provided a ‘don’t know’ answer, or no answer at all to both questions, were given a 
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missing value on the resulting scale for civic identification. In all other cases, the scale is equal to the 
mean value of both variables. 
 The second scale used in the analyses is constructed to measure the ‘softer’ cultural component 
of European identification. Bruter himself did not use this scale, which is why I constructed this scale to 
measure the respondent’s ‘emotional sense of belonging’ to Europe myself. The Eurobarometer surveys 
have occasionally asked respondents to grade their attachment to their town, region, country, and to 
Europe, which is a good candidate for measuring this aspect of identification with Europe. The problem 
that Bruter, referring to Burgess (2000), sees with this measurement, is that it remains unclear whether 
respondents are in fact talking about the same thing. He argues that it is questionable “whether identity 
is measurable by self-perception” (Bruter, 2005a, p. 102). According to him, respondents might not refer 
to “the same fundamental definitions and conceptions of identity” (ibid.). However, I argue that the 
question as it is posed in the Eurobarometer survey allows respondents to express an emotional 
attachment to given political concepts, and whether or not they have the same ‘definition’ of what an 
identity actually is, seems to me of less importance. In the end, the researcher determines whether such 
an expression fits his or her definition of identification; whether ‘attachment’ is a satisfactory measure 
of identification. I agree with Bruter that identity may not always be measurable by self-perception. 
However, in the case of European identification I would argue that any self-perception of a European 
identity is likely to be an under-representation of potential identification with Europe because identity is 
by definition contextual.16 
The eventual scale for measuring cultural identification with Europe is constructed based on 
two variables present in the Eurobarometer surveys. First, as noted, I included people’s ‘attachment’ to 
Europe. Additionally, in order to compensate to some extent to Bruter’s comments on the validity of 
this measure, I included the item measuring how ‘proud to be European’ people say to be. This way, the 
measurements are not merely limited to the contested item that I described above. Both variables were 
recoded to range from 0 (no attachment/pride) to 1 (highest degree of attachment/pride), and the mean 
of these two values was taken as the scale for cultural European identification. 
I will use multilevel regression analysis (for an overview of this technique, see Heck & Thomas, 
2000; Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999) to compare countries within Europe and 
individuals within countries. Before doing so, I will conduct several test to establish the empirical 
distinction between both scales of European identity. A factor analysis revealed that the four items18 
used to measure European identity could indeed be divided into two distinct factors, also when similar 
measurements for national identification were included in the analysis (see Appendix II). Both resulting 
scales correlated significantly with sufficient strength,20 and turned out to form reliable scales.21 The 
two scales are significantly and positively correlated (0.334 Pearson correlation, p < 0.01), which is not 
very surprising; people feeling identifying more strongly with Europe can be expected to support its 
political and economic integration as well. 
Qualitative data: Polish higher educated youth 
For an in-depth analysis of European identification, I decided to focus on Polish higher educated youth. 
During the fieldwork period in which I gathered my qualitative data (October 2007 – February 2008), I 
spent my time observing and talking to members of this specific group, and trying to understand their 
view of Europe and Poland. I interviewed them, but I also carefully observed their behaviour, and 
participated in their social events (cf. Spradley, 1979, 1980). They were my teachers, educating me in 
how to see the world and specifically Europe through their eyes. Many also became good friends, not 
only making my stay in Poland a warm and exciting experience, but also allowing me to ‘feel’ their 
emotional attachment to Poland and Europe. My fieldwork concentrated around the city of Kraków, but 
occasionally I also ventured out of the city to meet informants or conduct observations. As I mentioned 
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earlier, my decision to focus on this specific group was based on ‘critical case sampling’ or ‘theoretical 
sampling’ (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, pp. 80-83). Here, I will elaborate on why I believe this group is a critical 
case, and why analysis of these people’s views is theoretically important. 
 First, I think that Poland is an interesting case for studying the emergence of a European 
identity because it is one of the EU’s ‘new’ member states. If there is such a thing as an emerging 
European identification, then it is crucial to examine this process at its early stages. Of course, one 
should not assume that an identification with Europe only emerges when a country enters the EU. 
However, the way in which this shapes people’s thinking on ‘Europe’ does tell us something on how 
cultural identification may be related to civic identities (national or European). Furthermore, acceding 
to the EU in the largest expansion of the organization in history, and being one of the first countries 
from the former Eastern bloc to enter, it takes up a rather unique place in the development of Europe as 
an ‘integrated’ polity. Moreover, its EU membership is already surrounded with apparent 
inconsistencies, as it is portrayed as one of Europe’s most eurosceptic countries in the media, while at 
the same time, survey data suggests that Poland is also one of the most supportive countries when it 
comes to European integration (see introduction). Furthermore, Poles have been reported to show one 
of the highest levels of national pride in Europe (Jasińska-Kania & Marody, 2004, p. 230). 
 Historically, Poland has been torn between Eastern and Western Europe. Throughout the ages 
it has entertained passionately friendly relations with countries to the East (e.g. Lithuania) and the West 
(e.g. France). It has, however, also waged war in both direction, frequently fighting (among others) 
Muscovite or Russian armies in the East, and German or Austrian forces in the (South-) West. In the 
contemporary international political context, Polish identity is being recalibrated towards a European 
frame of reference. A telling example of how Poland, the largest ‘new’ EU member state, is claiming its 
place in its ‘return to Europe’ (see Maier & Risse, 2003), is the Polish stance in the discussion on the 
preamble to the ‘European Constitution’, and later the Lisbon Treaty. In this dialogue, Poland was one 
of the countries that seemed to be most in favour of including a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage 
in the Treaty. 
 I have chosen to focus on contemporary youth because they are the only living generation that 
is politically ‘conscious’, yet generally has only marginal personal memories of communist times. This 
period in Polish history is normally conceived of as an age of restricted political and economic freedom. 
This is often rhetorically contrasted by present times, that are supposedly characterized by virtually 
unbridled mobility and freedom. In the interviews that I had with my informants, some did remember 
particular personal events that they specifically associated with this period of their nation’s past. In 
virtually all cases, these memories were restricted to queues in front of shops without knowing what 
you were standing in line for. Others recalled family members bringing in goods from the West. My 
oldest informants were aged around 30, which would mean that they were 12 when the communist 
regime in Poland was effectively overthrown. Most, however, were in their early or mid-twenties, which 
means that they were 4-9 years old at that time. These are hardly ages in which a person can be expected 
to be sensitive to the macro-political context of that time. What they have experienced, however, is how 
their parents and grandparents represented the period before their birth and the early years of their 
lives. This creates a unique generation that – as a general rule – does not have any first-hand 
recollection of political hardship, but does have a strong image of such struggle engrained into their 





Thanks to the opening up of frontiers and job markets, young Polish people are experiencing 
something which has never previously been known in Poland's history. They can leave the 
country and come back to it without any problem, they can learn about different cultures, 
different solutions and ways of life and, thus, enrich their own experiences and ideas. They will 
return and will change Poland. — Henryk Wujec,22 Warsaw, July 2007, "Unia & Polska" issue 130/2007 
The above quote nicely illustrates another argument for choosing to analyse this specific group based on 
their age. They are the first Polish generation to experience the ‘fruits’ of European integration from 
close-by, at a personal level, and from an early age onwards. No other cohort still alive has experienced 
such a degree of geographically and politically unhindered access to large parts of Europe. In a few years 
time, this generation will have matured completely, and they may have come to expect nothing less than 
‘borderless’ mobility in Europe. They are part and parcel of a cohort that is not only connected to their 
country of origin, but also to members of the same generation in other parts of Europe or even the 
world. 
This argument is especially salient for higher educated youth and students, as they can be 
expected to maintain cross-national social networks to a greater degree than their lower educated 
counterparts.23 It is this generation and educational group, the ‘Erasmus Generation’ as it has also been 
called (Rifkin, 2004, p. 2), that will create the Europe of the coming few decades. They are the soon-to-
be European elite shaping the future of the continent, and yet we know very little about their views on 
this future. A whole generation of higher educated people with a distinctly different frame of reference 
than many of their parents will soon have a profound impact on politics and culture. Moreover, for such 
a ‘European’ frame of reference to emerge, one would expect that history needs to be partly reinvented 
as well. While old rivalries between, say, Germany and Poland might be perceived to be of less 
importance, other rifts (most likely vis-à-vis Russia) might be imagined to become greater (see also 
Zarycki, 2004). 
European identity cross-nationally: a quantitative analysis 
It was between 2001 and 2007 that the EU experienced its largest expansion in history. Also, several 
countries ‘physically’ enforced the provisions of the Schengen Treaty (i.e. ‘opening’ borders), and the 
Euro was introduced in an additional number of countries. The development of respondent’s civic and 
cultural attitudes towards Europe during this period is shown in the graphs below.27 These trends are 
depicted for Europe as a whole (left) and Poland in particular (right). The straight line depicts 
respondent’s mean civic identification with Europe, while the dotted line represents people’s mean 
cultural identification. These graphs clearly show different developments of civic and cultural 
identification between 2001 and 2007. Moreover, the developments for the EU as a whole are rather 
different from those for Poland in particular. This reinforces the importance of choosing Poland for an 








As we can see for the EU as a whole, both identification components remained relatively stable between 
2001 and 2007. This pattern is quite similar to that of most ‘old’ EU member states in the Western part 
of the continent. In Poland, up until 2004 the level of cultural identification with Europe was actually 
higher than the level of civic identification. This is remarkable, because it is one of the very few 
countries where this was the case.28 In 2004, the year of accession for many new EU member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the graph for Poland shows that civic identification started to increase 
quite strongly, overtaking cultural identification, which stayed more or less stable or even declined 
somewhat. 
 This development can be explained by seeing it in the light of Poland’s rhetorical ‘return to 
Europe’ (see Aniot, 1997; Mach, 1993a, 1997, 2000, 2001; Maier & Risse, 2003). I would argue that 
before 2004, when Poland was not yet a member of the EU, people tended to express a relatively high 
level of cultural identification with Europe because it allowed them to (1) identify with a positively 
evaluated group (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and (2) assert boundaries towards one of Poland’s most 
significant European Others: Russia (Zarycki, 2004). After 2004 this cultural identification decreased 
somewhat towards the EU average. The civic component then took over much of this identification, 
which makes sense, as Polish citizens actually became European citizens in the legal sense of the word. 
Difference did not need to be asserted through a cultural attachment to ‘Europe’ anymore; they had 
‘hard proof’ of their Europeanness. The boundaries had become more clear (cf. Blok, 2000). Differently 
put, these figures are not a direct measurement of identification, but they show how Europeanness is 
expressed (i.e. through a cultural or civic discourse). Therefore, I argue that these changes through time 
show how the discourse on Polish Europeanness has changed. Where they would first express it through 
a cultural discourse, the accession in 2004 gave Poles other, civic means by which they could assert their 
European identity, simultaneously reaffirming their difference towards ‘less European’ nations (e.g. 
Russia and Belarus; see Zarycki, 2004). 
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Table 1 - Multilevel regression models of the cultural component of European identification (0=low – 1=high). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Intercept .590** .014 .512** .015 .539** .015 .279** .013 .290** .016 .850** .117 .329** .157 
Individual characteristics   
Control variables   
Age (0=15) .000** .000 .000** .000 -.001** .000 -.001** .000 -.001** .000 -.001** .000 
Gender (1=female) -.007** .002 -.004* .002 -.006** .002 -.007** .002 -.007** .001 -.007** .001 
Education (years) .004** .000 .003** .000 .003** .000 .003** .000 .003** .000 .003** .000 
Left-right placement (0=left, 9=right) .008** .000 .007** .000 .004** .000 .004 .003 .004 .003 .004 .003 
Social position   
Student (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Manager .015** .003 .009** .003 .008** .003 .008** .003 .008** .003 
White collar -.013** .003 -.013** .003 -.013** .003 -.013** .003 -.013** .003 
Manual labour -.035** .003 -.034** .002 -.034** .002 -.034** .002 -.034** .002 
House work -.032** .004 -.035** .003 -.034** .003 -.035** .003 -.035** .003 
Unemployed -.042** .004 -.034** .003 -.033** .003 -.034** .003 -.034** .003 
Retired -.011** .003 -.016** .003 -.016** .003 -.018** .003 -.018** .003 
National identity   
Emotional national identity (0-1) .389** .003 .376** .021 .377** .021 .376** .021 
Fear loss of national identity (0-1) -.094** .002 -.090** .002 -.091** .002 -.091** .002 
National characteristics   
Years of EU membership  -.031** .001 -.031** .001 
Iron Curtain variables   
Former USSR satellite (ref.)  (ref.)
Former USSR territory  .102~ .268 
Never in Eastern Bloc  .780** .174 
Variances   
Variance level 1 (individual) .073** .000 .072** .000 .072** .000 .063** .000 .062** .000 .062** .000 .062** .000 
Variance level 2 (country) .006** .002 .006** .001 .006** .002 .005** .001 .007** .002 .389** .105 .240** .066 
Variance left-right placement  .000** .000 .000** .000 .000** .000 
Variance emotional national identity   .012** .003 .012** .003 .012** .003 
-2 log likelihood 27338.445 25612.697 25159.325 9784.480 8155.938 7382.561 7367.216 
Improvement 1725.748 453.372 15374.845 1628.542 773.377 15.346 
Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, 63.4, 64.2, 65.2, 66.1 (2004/2005/2006), added contextual characteristics. 
Notes: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.10; ~ p < 0.10. Ni=122,484, Nj=29. 
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Who feels European? 
It is the cultural rhetorical strategy that enabled Poland’s ‘return to Europe’ even before its accession to 
the European Union (see above). It represents the European identity of people even without taking into 
account their evaluation of their country’s EU membership. The level of civic identification may have 
various different causes, ranging from a respondent’s emotional or political attachment to Europe 
(Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; McLaren, 2002), to her judgement on the EU’s achievements in specific 
policy areas (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007; Luedtke, 2005; Mau, 2005). Therefore, I argue that the cultural 
identification component is closer to an emotionally expressed European identity. Moreover, civic 
identification has been the (explicit or implicit) subject of a number of prior studies (e.g. Bruter, 2005b; 
Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005, 2007; Luedtke, 2005; Mau, 2005). For these reasons, I have chosen to focus 
on the cultural component of European identity for my multilevel regression analysis (see Table 1). 
The ‘null-model’ (model 1), shows that countries are sufficiently different with regard to the 
cultural identity component to justify multilevel analysis. The subsequent models include individual 
level variables, and models 6 and 7 include national level characteristics as well. Finally, the 
improvement of the -2 log likelihood indicates the increasingly better fit of the models (lower is better). 
Below, I will consecutively discuss the effect on expressed cultural identification of a respondent’s age, 
education, their political orientation, their social position (i.e. students), and their identification with 
the nation-state. Then, I will look at contextual (i.e. national) differences, and how these affect the level 
of cultural identification with Europe. There, I will first go into the varying effects of national identity 
and political (left-right) orientation in different countries, and then test the effect of the duration of a 
country’s EU membership and its post-socialist past. 
Individual characteristics 
With regard to the effect of age, there are two aspects of this measurement that should be taken into 
account. Firstly, younger people as a generation were born in a globalized, transnational era, which 
arguably makes them culturally skilled and more flexible in cross-cultural/national exchange than 
people from generations before them. Secondly, prior empirical research has repeatedly suggested that 
the younger people are, the more flexible they generally respond to social change (cf. Lubbers, 2008; 
Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007). Considering Poland’s relatively recent communist experience, its 
subsequent national independence, and its contemporary accession to the EU makes for a radically 
changing political context. The more elaborate models corroborate these argumentations, as they show 
that older people are less likely than younger people to express a cultural identification with Europe.29  
Regarding the respondents’ level of education, there are four arguments that I would like to 
present. First, I argue that higher educated people are more likely to entertain transnational social 
networks than are lower educated people because of the ‘international’ context of the professions of the 
higher educated. In turn, these are likely to lead to expanded informal social networks as well. Being 
connected to people from other cultures in such a way leads to the need for acquiring a cultural 
framework that is adapted to such a context (Ultee, 1989, p. 15). Such a framework could easily evoke 
feelings of ‘feeling’ European, since it is by definition transnational. Second, education can be seen as a 
proxy for measuring intercultural and language capabilities. With regard to the latter, one could argue 
that being able to speak at least English as a second language is an increasingly important aspect of any 
higher educated profession. Third, higher educated people benefit most directly (or most visibly) from 
cross-border flows of capital, goods and knowledge (Ultee, 1989). While national elites converge to form 
a new European elite, lower strata remain ‘national’ in their orientation, and may even emphasize these 
‘allegiances’ in a response to the ‘loss’ of national culture that they perceive. If this holds true, then 
European societies potentially face a new and growing kind of inequality; the ‘European gap’. Finally, 
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higher educated individuals are more likely to participate in, or at least follow debates concerning the 
EU, which potentially makes them feel more involved with it as well (Inglehart, 1970; McLaren, 2001, p. 
90). Based on these four arguments, I would expect that the higher educated people are, the more likely 
it is that they express a cultural identification with Europe. This is, indeed, confirmed by the significant 
positive regression coefficients for the years of education in models 2 through 7. 
 My informants in the case study that I will present in the second section of this paper were not 
only higher educated and relatively young, most of them were also students. Although age and education 
are two of the most defining characteristics of what it means to be a ‘student’, it does not cover all 
aspects of this social role. To account for this, I compared students to other social groups in society. The 
variables that I included are all ‘dummies’, with students as the reference category. Students are likely to 
travel even more than their non-student counterparts, and participate in international educational 
networks and programmes (of which the Erasmus programme is the most striking example). As a result, 
they build and maintain more elaborate international networks, facilitated through modern 
communication technologies. A more ‘international’ orientation should subsequently have a positive 
effect on their cultural identification with Europe. The regression analysis indeed shows that students 
express significantly higher levels of cultural identification with Europe than all other layers of society 
except managers. This seems to confirm that the contemporary student’s social reality should be 
conceptualized within a European frame of reference, even if we control for age. 
Concerning the political orientations of respondents, I decided to include the subjective 
position on the leftwing – rightwing continuum. Here, people were asked to place their ideological 
political views in a continuum ranging from 1 (left-wing) to 10 (right-wing). As McLaren suggest, 
“individuals on the left appear to be more open to changes in society” (2001, p. 89). This would make 
them feel more positive about the macro-political changes involved in European integration than their 
rightwing counterparts. Conversely, models 2, 3, and 4 suggest that people on the right of the political 
range express a stronger cultural identification with Europe than people on the left. McLaren explains 
such relations by saying that economically leftist individuals might object to the ‘capitalist’ nature of the 
EU (McLaren, 2002, p. 562). However, this should not necessarily have an impact on people’s cultural 
identification with Europe, as this explanation explicitly refers to the European Union rather than 
‘Europe’ as a cultural concept. A tentative30 answer to this issue could be derived from the historical 
development of civic and cultural identification that I described above, as it suggests that the European 
Union might in fact have taken over some of the symbolic associations with ‘Europe’ as a broader 
concept (and vice versa). 
European and national identifications may or may not be perceived to be hierarchically related, 
and they may or may not be conceptualized as being incompatible (Carey, 2002; Deflem & Pampel, 
1996; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2002, 2004, 2006; Smith, 1992). I 
contend that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as I have argued above. If this holds true, then 
an individual’s identification with his or her nation(s) should not have a significant negative impact on 
their identification with Europe in my analysis. In fact, building on Duchesne & Frognier (2008), I 
would expect that a strong identification with the nation has a cumulative relation to European 
identification. This expectation is indeed supported by the analysis, as models 4 through 7 show. In fact, 
the greatest improvement in model fit occurs when the national identity variables are included, which 
indicates the importance of this measure. The ‘emotional’ national identification has a significant 
positive effect on European cultural identity, which confirms my argument against conceptualizing 
national and European identities as mutually exclusive. This corroborates outcomes found in other 
recent studies32 (Duchesne & Frognier, 2008; McLaren, 2004). 
Fear of losing one’s national identity to ‘Europe’, on the other hand, has a significant negative 
impact on European cultural identification. This intriguing result can be explained by considering which 
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associations are activated when a respondent is confronted with questions such as these. Here, the 
common assumption that Europe and the nation are mutually exclusive is activated. If a respondent is 
asked to rate his/her attitude towards Europe, this attitude is likely to be more positive than when the 
same respondent is confronted with the same question, but in explicit opposition to the nation. If the 
nation is explicitly placed in opposition to Europe, then ‘Europe’ becomes a threat, while if the nation is 
not mentioned in the question, but one is merely asked to express an attachment to or pride of Europe, 
these ‘nested’ levels of identity do not exclude each other. In other words; when asked to pick sides 
between either Europe or the nation, most people are inclined to choose the latter (see Duchesne & 
Frognier, 2008, pp. 154-155, for a similar line of argumentation). 
National characteristics 
In my discussion above, I focused on the effects of individual characteristics on cultural identification 
with Europe. In the following paragraphs, I will devote more attention to national differences. The 
nation-state is still Europe’s primary source of collective identification (Calhoun, 2007), so national 
characteristics are likely to define how ‘Europe’ is framed as well; especially when it comes to 
identification. Furthermore, determining whether European and national identities are mutually 
exclusive or not is one of the central arguments of this paper.  
Against this backdrop, I chose to estimate national identity and the respondent’s subjective left-
right placement as a random effect. From model 5 onwards, I allowed the these items to vary randomly 
across countries. This means that instead of estimating a ‘fixed’ effect for these variables across 
countries (i.e. for the whole of Europe), the effect of these variables is estimated within countries. The 
variance results for model 5 indicate that the difference in effect of national identity is significant across 
countries.34 More importantly, it shows that even if we allow the effect of national identification to be 
different for every country, an emotional attachment to the country is still more likely to go together 
with a stronger sense of European identity. 
Subjective left-right placement should be expected to have different results in various European 
countries, because being ‘left’ is very likely to mean something entirely different in especially post-
socialist and western European countries. While inhabitants of the former may often equate (moderate) 
leftist ideology with political correctness, citizens of the latter are likely to associate it with their 
communist pasts. This indeed holds true in the present analysis, as the variance across countries is 
highly significant. This argument is further supported by the fact that all regression models that include 
left-right placement as a random effect do not show a significant effect of the main variable for left-right 
placement, while the models with this variable as a fixed effect do. 
As I have suggested above, people’s cultural and civic identifications with Europe are 
interrelated. Therefore, I expect that the years of membership of a given country has an effect on the 
people’s cultural identification with Europe (in addition to their civic identity, as the graphs on page 10 
suggest). In which way exactly, however, is subject to debate. When it comes to civic identification, it is 
often argued that the longer a country is a member of the EU, the more people feel to be citizens of this 
polity (i.e. civic identity; see Anderson & Reichert, 1996; Bruter, 2005a, p. 31; Greenstein, 1965; Hix, 
2005; Inglehart, 1971; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2007, p. 649). However, I argue that the opposite is likely 
to be true when it comes to cultural identification; that citizens of countries that have been a member of 
the EU for a relatively long period are actually less likely to express a cultural European identity. I 
suggest that individuals in ‘old’ member states may have grown to take ‘Europe’ at their doorstep for 
granted. Unhindered border passage, for example, has been a reality in many of these countries for a 
great number of years. Grand ‘ideals’ of the European project such as peace and prosperity have been 
mostly already achieved in most if not all of the ‘old’ member states, for over a generation (or two). 
Conversely, several of the ‘newer’ members have quite a recent history (or at least contemporary 
15 
 
collective memory) of external suppression and less than ideal economic circumstances. For them, 
wanting to ‘belong’ to Europe may still have the connotation of these grand ideals that may well have 
faded away in ‘older’ member states. Additionally, as the graphs in Figure 1 on page 10 suggests, a civic 
identity may ‘take over’ from the former cultural identification with Europe, in a way ‘channelling’ 
identification through a formalized ‘state-like’ conception. As models 6 and 7 show, a longer 
membership period indeed decreases people’s cultural identification with Europe, confirming the above 
arguments. 
 Finally, in 2009 the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union will be celebrated in 
many Eastern and Central European countries. The fact that one can expect that Russia will not 
‘celebrate’ this fact as enthusiastically as these countries illustrates how the past still resonates in the 
present. The post-socialist past of many current EU member states is inherently present in people’s 
political conceptions, and cannot be ignored in this analysis. Many might see their country’s association 
with ‘Europe’ as an instrument in their move away from Russia, asserting their independence from their 
former oppressor. If this is true, these people will identify more strongly with the concept of ‘Europe’. In 
my analysis, I included dummies for the countries’ former involvement in the ‘Eastern Bloc’. As my 
focus is more heavily on Poland, I chose to use former USSR satellite states as the reference category. 
The people from the former USSR territories (the Baltic countries) do not convincingly differ from the 
former USSR satellites, but do ‘hint’ towards culturally identifying more strongly with Europe. 
Furthermore, people from the former USSR satellite states generally express significantly lower levels of 
cultural identification with Europe than people who are not from former Eastern Bloc countries at all. 
This result is not completely consistent with what I would expect to encounter based on my argument 
above. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that these effects are controlled for the effect of the number of 
years of EU membership,36 this result once again suggests that a civic identification with the EU has 
begun to ‘take over’ a part of people’s cultural identification with ‘Europe’. 
 
In the above sections, I have elaborated on my theoretical framework, introduced my data and methods, 
and discussed the results of my quantitative analysis. Below, I will present the results of my qualitative 
case study among higher educated Polish youth. After that, I will offer my conclusions to the article as a 
whole. 
Polish higher educated youth: qualitative findings 
While the analysis of Eurobarometer survey data offers an excellent way to gain insight into which people 
in which countries identify with Europe, it does far less to enable us to understand what being European 
‘means’. When it comes to European identification, a quantitative analysis on its own really can be seen 
as only scratching the surface of the complete picture. In order to fill this gap, I will discuss my 
conclusions regarding the Polish higher educated case that I examined qualitatively in the paragraphs 
below. I have organised this section into two main themes that arose from the analysis of the interview 
data. Both themes together show how the Polish higher educated youth that I interviewed constructed 
their European identity, and how cultural (e.g. shared historical experiences) and civic (e.g. EU 
accession) played a role in this. 
First, I will go into the way in which my informants defined their own identity by setting social 
boundaries based on generational difference rather than nationality. This difference was expressed 
through a conception of a ‘communist heritage’, and came to the fore quite explicitly during the 2007 
national elections. After that, I will continue with second theme of this section which deals with the 
concept of ‘Central Europe’. The way in which my informants dealt with the generational difference and 
the ‘communist heritage’ that they perceived to exist, was to construct a sense of social change. ‘Central 
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Europe’ was predominantly used to express this change, as it allowed for the continuous blurring of 
boundaries between East and West; past and future. 
The ‘student generation’ and the ‘communist heritage’ in Polish politics 
For the Polish youth that I interviewed, when talking to them about ‘being Polish’ and/or ‘European’, 
differentiation towards significant Others did not primarily lie in nationality, but in “generation”. They 
saw themselves as members of the generation that will deal with Poland’s difficult past; as a generation 
that will rise above the disagreements that Europeans have had in the past. The only problem in 
achieving this, however, was that – according to them – the image that people from other countries 
have of Poland is still continuously stained by remainders of a ‘communist heritage’. They are ‘stuck’ 
with this ‘old generation’ who is ‘still afraid’ of Europe because even now, they are submitted to the yoke 
of a ‘communist mindset’. When expressing attitudes like these, my informants would often describe 
these things as ‘remnants from the past’ that have yet to be overcome. A ‘communist heritage’ that was 
not really ‘supposed’ to be present in Polish society, but that was introduced almost through a ‘historic 
anomaly’ (see Kundera, 1984; Mach, 1997; Pelkmans, 2006, p. 220; Verdery, 1996, 1999, p. 112; Wedel, 
2001). 
 
 [There are] problems that we have to combat. Because there is something like a heritage of 
communism. We have to get rid of it. Sometimes there is still this mentality within people, 
because some people have grown up and have learned some kind of thinking during 
communism. [Such as] Attitude to life, expectation from the state. Not taking their life in their 
own hands, just expecting that everything will be given to them, and in the... also the lack of 
politeness. I think that is something like the heritage of communism. Ignorance, maybe. — Monika 
When asked whether this ‘communist thinking’ is present in all people’s minds equally, Monika replied 
that among the younger generation, it is “not so visible, but it’s still in the people, because they are 
brought up in the company of their parents, who are just used to do it”. However, when asked whether 
she practices this ‘communist thinking’ herself  because of this, she replied that: 
 
When you travel a lot, study abroad, meet with people, you have a different experience. A 
different way of thinking. You find different solutions, lifestyles and models. Entertainment, 
you can have it. Something that brings you satisfaction. Maybe you feel just the thing that you 
are more conscious about what you can do with your life. — Monika 
As I found with most informants, they explicitly defined themselves as a “generation” that travels a lot, 
learns about other languages and nations, and can be open to other cultures because they are confident 
of their own national identity. This enabled them to be ‘open to Europe’ as well, whereas they felt that 
the ‘older generation’ was ‘still closed’ to Europe due to historical experiences. 
 
This older generation is still afraid of [Europe]. Because there is this wars, and they are still 
afraid of wars, and this communist regime in Poland. And we younger people we are more 
confident. We want to travel, to know other cultures, other nationalities, kitchen, haha. It’s not 






This differentiation between themselves as people for whom the past is “not a problem” on the one 
hand, and the ‘others’ as people who are “still” struggling with communist and WWII memories on the 
other, resembles closely what Morawska has called the ‘it does not matter anymore’ and the trudna 
polskosc (‘difficult Polishness’) orientations (2003, p. 176). 
The difference between these ‘generations of Polishness’ and how they are divided on (among 
other things) ‘European’ issues clearly came to the fore during the election for the Sejm in October 
2007. According to my informants, the people in the ‘old generation’ consistently support specific, 
‘dubious’ political parties ‘without even thinking’. These forces were mainly embodied by the Law and 
Justice (PiS) political party (see Figure 2 for an example of this rhetoric), which put the Kaczynski twins 
on the posts of Prime Minister and President of Poland between 2005 and 2007. In their eyes, the 
politicians of such parties represent a large, xenophobic, ‘closed’, religious, and conservative majority 
that ‘doesn’t think’. This in turn leads to these ‘incompetent’ politicians representing Poland in Europe, 
consequently resulting in the publication of various ‘embarrassing’ messages in international media. 
However, rather than simply an aversion to the national government in general or the politics of the PiS 
coalition in particular, my informants maintained a frame of ‘Othering’ towards all things this ‘old’ 
political style symbolized to them; conservatism, euro-scepticism, and amateurism. Beyond (but 
including) national politics, to them this affected Polish society at large. 
 
That is [a] thing that I’m ashamed of. In our country, everything is working so badly. The 
government, the plans, construction, they are working so slow, they are not working properly. 
Everywhere you go, everything is not well organized. You know, you go to the best hotels and 
the service is horrible. — Monika 
It happens all the time. All the time. I feel ashamed of Poland every time I take up a foreign 
newspaper, like ‘The Economist’, ‘Der Spiegel’, any important foreign newspaper. […] The 
newspapers that everyone reads; they impact your way of thinking. [...] Most of the time, when I 
read any of these foreign newspapers, I would say that I am ashamed of Polish politicians, and 
the general Polish public. [...] They should not behave like this. They should behave like 




Figure 2 - “One nation, one party, one leader”
(my translation). A satirical election campaign
poster depicting one of the Kaczynski twins as a
grandmother. It appeared in the left-wing
newspaper NIE, 18 October 2007. 
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For my informants, ‘Europe’ clearly was a very important issue in the political debate surrounding the 
most recent (October 2007) elections (for a discussion on Polish national politics regarding the EU, see 
Millard, 1999). Most young people that I discussed the topic with, almost immediately started to ask 
questions about how people in the Netherlands see Poland following the actions of their “stupid 
politicians”. Alternatively, they started to offer apologies for the behaviour of their political 
representatives. In both cases, they were specifically referring to the 2005-2007 government of “the 
twins” (PiS), and they would distance themselves from this ‘kind of thinking’ by representing 
themselves to be of another generation. This is exemplified by Szymon’s response to the eurosceptical 
(PiS) political rhetoric that EU membership will deprive Poland of its national identity: 
 
It is the same way of thinking as my grandpa. And they... I don’t know... How can you, the 
Netherlands, Germany, France, influence Poland? How? [rhetorical] We have our nationality. 
We are Polish. We have got our own culture, we are different, we will not lose it because, you 
know, we’ve got open borders and it’s easier to invest in our country. — Szymon (original emphases) 
Needless to say, my informants were quite relieved that the Civic Platform (PO) party won the elections, 
as Julia indicates: “I was really proud of Poles during [these] elections. [...] This  is the first time that I 
really saw people reacting to the whole craziness in the political world”. Nevertheless, even with the 
apparent lack of sympathy for PiS and all that it symbolized among the youth around me and other 
higher educated people I met, the party still managed to get 32,11% of the votes. This is actually 5,11 
percentage points higher than in the 2005 elections. Suffice it to say that the Polish political context 
paints a somewhat divided picture. Support for the EU, but also an identification with Europe is 
intrinsically connected with this political, social and generational gap, as I noticed the importance that 
these higher educated young people attached to how ‘European’ Poland was in the eyes of other 
(western) Europeans. 
Central Europe and the return to ‘normality’ 
As Teresa pointed out on page 16, being part of ‘Europe’ is “not a problem” because  younger people are 
more confident”, linking this attitude directly to a different perspective on historical events like the 
Second World War and Poland’s communist period. Because of a relative ‘detachment’ from Poland’s 
difficult past ('trudna polskosc', see Morawska, 2003, p. 176), they as a ‘generation’ can be proud of 
Poland and embrace ‘Europe’ at the same time. However, with regard to the ‘level’ of Europeanness of 
Poles and Poland, my informants regularly expressed some doubt. Teresa’s analysis of Polishness 
exposes this tension: 
 
 [...] it’s a problem of Polish people that all the time we think that Polish people are good, we are 
the best... On the other hand we are on the end of Europe. On the other hand [still] we are on that 
[western] side of Eastern Europe; we are better than Russians or something like this. And when 
we are abroad in this eastern part of Europe, and we see something like [the ‘destruction’ of 
Polish heritage by Ukrainians, JM] we think; ‘how can they do that, we are so great!’, so 
fantastic, so hmmm... — Teresa, my emphases, my remarks between brackets39 
She explicitly opposes ‘being good’ to being ‘on the end of Europe’, suggesting a positive evaluation of 
not being ‘on the end of Europe’. On the other hand, she indicates that Poland is on the western side of 






I argue that this ‘somewhat marginal’ position, but also the move away from this position is enacted 
through the reinvention of the concept of ‘Central Europe’ vis-à-vis Eastern and Western Europe. Its 
predecessor, the German concept of Mitteleuropa, came into usage for the first time around the end of 
the 19th century (see Philipps, 2008; Stirk, 1994). It was important in the legitimization of the German 
wish for expansion into the Central European area during the First and Second World War (Katzenstein, 
1997). Following the end of the Second World War, Europe was divided politically into an Eastern and a 
Western part during the Cold War period. However, while in the Western part of Europe, Mitteleuropa 
remained largely absent from public discourse, it continued to have a place in intellectual circles in 
countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (ibid., see also Garton Ash, 1989). With the fall 
of communism, and the gradual decline of the stark East-West division in Europe, came the reinvention 
of the concept of ‘Central Europe’ (Katzenstein, 1997; Rupnik, 1990). In the 1980’s, “the promotion of 
the slogan ‘Central Europe’ had a political goal [...]” (Tomaszewski, 2001, p. 34), because it symbolized 
the yearning for independence from the Soviet Bloc. Then, Central Europe could be defined as the area 
that “geographically lies in the middle, culturally in the West, and politically in the East” (Kundera, as 
quoted in Tomaszewski, 2001, p. 35). However, despite the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the 
subsequent independence of Central European states, ‘Central Europe’ has remained a relevant 
category, and has arguably even become more important in contemporary Europe. 
With the expansion of the Western European sphere of cooperation and economical / political 
integration Eastwards, the meaning and definition of Central Europe shifted again. Among my 
informants, there were two ways in which ‘Central Europe’ was defined. First, it was framed as a 
‘cultural area’ with a shared historical experience, as Tomasz indicated: 
 
We have the same historical experience [as] the Hungarians for example [...] And this makes us 
like, understand each other easier. But his does not make us totally different like a different 
world from other parts of Europe. Just a little closer, but not necessarily in a nostalgic way. I’m 
not saying that I like to spend time more with Hungarians that I do with Spanish. But if I go out 
or live with Hungarian people, some things are just easier to understand. Like I don’t have to 
explain that I’m eating my meal to the very last drop, because I was raised in a country where 
food was hardly accessible. If I go to Hungary, it is obvious, but if I go to Spain, I may have to 
explain it. — Tomasz 
Second, and more importantly, perhaps, Central Europe was seen as not so much a distinctive category 
per sé, but rather as an expression of enduring liminality; of being neither ‘Eastern’ nor ‘Western’. Kamila 
phrased this quite strikingly: “Central is what is not on the East or the West”. Differently put: 
 
Central Europe would be exactly the area that was always asked whether it belongs to the East 
or to the West. And we don’t know, so usually they said we are central. [...] Because we are 
always asked whether we are pro-Russian or pro-European Union, we just say we’re Central. — Julia 
This ‘neither/nor’ frame of Central Europe was expressed very often by my informants. They were 
neither Eastern, nor Western; therefore, they were Central. I argue that these blurry boundaries allowed 
my informants to use the concept of Central Europe to express change. They employed the concept in 
order to perform – and be part of – a shift from a difficult past in ‘the East’ towards a ‘better’, 






We used to be called Eastern Europe. [...] But right now I think we are Central Europe. We are 
not like Ukrainians, Belarusians and so on. And we are not the same as Germany and Austria. 
We are in the middle. We are not like Eastern, we are not like Western. — Szymon 
This dynamic aspect of European ‘areas’ was often stated quite literally by my informants, 
conceptualizing Central Europe as the area that is ‘not yet’ at ‘the same level’ as Western Europe. When I 
asked people how to define Central Europe, they would often describe it using words like “still”, “not 
yet”, or “catching up” before referring to what they saw as Western European qualities. 
 
We are still not prepared for [a smoothly working society] I think. We are still sometimes behind 
the rest of Europe. We’re catching up. It takes some time until we have the same standards, the 
same service, or just cultural stuff. [...] We need to catch up some politeness to deal with people, 
because I still don’t think we have a high standard in this. [...] I was travelling and getting to 
know some other stuff in Germany, Austria, and I’m coming here [in Poland] and I’m 
disappointed and I’m noticing [these bad things]. I wasn’t noticing it before. I wasn’t conscious 
about it before. And learning new things, learning new places, I just noticed, we are far behind the 
others. [...] It is changing, but very slowly, it will take many years. — Monika, my emphases 
Following such changes (that may or may not be expected to actually happen), would be a redefinition of 
what is Eastern, Central, and Western Europe as well: 
 
Szymon:  Have you heard our plans [ironically]? Our Prime Minister said that Poland will be 
another Ireland because of our economic growth. He promised. We’ll see 
[sceptical]. 
JM:  What will happen to Poland if this will happen? 
Szymon:  It will be more Western. The difference between countries like the Czech Republic 
and Poland compared to Ukraine and Belarus will be bigger and bigger. 
JM:  Would you still call it Central Europe? 
Szymon:  No [resolutely]. It will become Western Europe. 
 
Here the economic discourse was mostly used to express a number of other qualities of Central Europe 
that are seen to be in flux. However, when discussing the subject further, many would indicate that 
being ‘closer to the western part of Europe’ actually means more than simply improving the country’s 
economy. According to Anastazia, it also means “to educate the young generation, to open up the 
borders, and increase the level of awareness to religions, customs, cultures. To be open-minded, to 
travel, live, and work in other countries”. My informants felt that they themselves as a ‘generation’ were 
the very fabric of this transformation, as Anastazia indicates: 
 
Something still has to change, and we have to run very fast to get to Europe. Because it is our point 
at the horizon where we want to be. We want to be as good as Germany, France. As big, as 
important, as well know. Because we are not. We have big unemployment, poverty, a bad 
government. These things should change. But I think the new generation is on the right way to 







‘Getting to Europe’, as Anastazia phrases it in the quote above, was conceptualized by my informants as 
a ‘natural’ process that would lead Poland ‘back’ to ‘normality’, ridding itself from the ‘heritage of 
communism’ (see above), and ‘returning’ to its place ‘in Europe’. Central Europe’s socialist experience 
was seen as “deviating from ‘natural’ Western history” (Pelkmans, 2006, p. 220; see also Wedel, 2001). 
 
Monika:  Because people [in Poland nowadays] are travelling, they are more open, you know. 
[...] They notice that their life is on a different level. They can afford more things, 
they... they have different standards of life, they are learning new things, they are 
more civilized. 
JM:  Is that a good direction for Poland to go? 
Monika:  To become more civilized? Yes, of course, haha. 
JM:  How would you feel about Poland becoming completely like Western Europe? 
Monika: Yes. [I would like it] to become normal. 
JM:  Normal? 
Monika:  Hmhm [confirms]. 
 
On the road to ‘normality’, Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004 as well as to the Schengen 
border union in 2007 were both conceived as clear moves in the right direction. This movement was 
seen as Poland becoming “more European” (Julia), and therefore “more civilized” (Monika). When I 
asked my informants how they felt about entering the EU and/or Schengen, they replied they felt more 
“Western”, more “European” (Julia), and that they “are more important now” (Wiktor). 
 
I think after the access to the European Union, I felt more like Western or Central Europe than 
Eastern Europe. And sometimes when I hear about Poland as one of the countries of Eastern 
Europe, I say like ‘hey! We’re not in Eastern Europe!’, haha! Western European because of 
theory. [...] Because of being involved in a Western process. That’s where it started, actually. [...] 
I remember when we were talking about [accession] we still had one leg in communism. [...] It 
was very important for Poland to become a part of Europe. Not of Eastern Europe, or a Russian 
something... — Julia 
 I can really remember that moment when Poland entered the European Union. I remember I 
felt that we were a little more European now too. […] Before, we used to be outside of Europe, 
now we were back in. — Olga 
I felt more normal [when Poland joined Schengen]. It’s just that I felt that we were more 
civilized, you know. We are allowed to travel freely without treating us like a lower category 
national, and I feel really sorry for people who are trying to cross the Polish border, like 
Ukraine.... — Monika 
When asked what would happen if Poland was to develop economically to the same level as Western 
Europe, they would say that it ‘should’ also become more “polite”, “normal”, and “civilized”. Accession to 
the EU and Schengen were seen as (instrumental) steps towards a “future” (Szymon) where Poland 








With this article, I hope to have given a modest, yet valuable contribution to the exciting body of 
literature on the emerging European identity. The conclusions in this work should be seen as supportive 
to Bruter (2003, 2004, 2005a) and other’s (e.g. Smith, 1991, 1992, 1995) analytical distinction between 
‘civic’ and ‘cultural’ components of political identities. The quantitative and qualitative findings 
complement each other in a number of ways. 
First, the variables included in the multilevel analysis of Eurobarometer data to measure age, 
education, left-right placement, and social group, relate to the discussions on Polish political discourse 
mentioned in the qualitative section. I found a significant negative relation between age and European 
cultural identification, as well as a positive relation between this identity component and the level of 
education. This, together with the fact that students (and managers) are the social group that identifies 
most strongly with Europe according to the quantitative analysis, indicates that especially the younger 
higher educated students feel emotionally attached to Europe. This adds width to the qualitative 
findings, as it suggests that the transnational, European network of students that my informants often 
expressed to identify themselves with, actually does seem to relate to an empirical reality in a wider 
European context. Conversely, the quantitative findings are provided with depth regarding the Polish 
case and perhaps even cases like it, as it explicates the framework of national politics and the attitude 
towards Europe of the higher educated youth. It offers an additional insight into the social dynamics 
underlying the ‘cold’ figures, because it explicates the social and historical framework in which such 
attitudes are conceived. 
 Second, Poland’s ‘return to Europe’ can be seen as part of a larger ‘reconfiguration’ of national 
and European identifications. While my qualitative investigation confronted me with young Poles 
enthusiastically embracing the possibilities that the ‘new’ Europe has to offer them, the quantitative 
analysis suggests that many people in the ‘older’ member-states actually seem to express lower levels of 
cultural identification with Europe. This might imply that European ‘core ideals’ such as peace and 
prosperity resonate more clearly with people in the ‘new’ member states than with those in the ‘old’ 
ones. In ‘old’ Europe, peace and prosperity might already be taken for granted after one or more peaceful 
and prosperous generations have passed. The discourse on the ‘communist heritage’ that my informants 
expressed confirms that this idea is indeed still very much alive. Moreover, ‘European ideals’ are seen as 
a way to ‘get rid of’ this problematic past, as they are seen to have the potential to ‘move’ Central Europe 
(and thereby Poland) Westwards, where they can finally be a ‘normal’ country again. 
 Finally, it should be stressed that if there is anything that both the qualitative as well as the 
quantitative analyses have shown in their own right, it is that national and European identity should not 
be conceptualized or measured as mutually exclusive social phenomena. In fact, both suggest that a 
strong emotional identification with the nation-state enforces rather than prevents a cultural 
identification with Europe. Whether we are using quantitative or qualitative approaches, it is only when 
researchers like ourselves ask people to make the choice between either of these ‘nested’ identities, that 
people tend to select their nation as their collective identity. In their daily reality, however, such an 
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Appendix I – General research process 
 
The general research process for the entire research project as well as the steps undertaken in the 
qualitative data collection are schematically depicted below. Please note that these steps refer to the 
research process as a whole, which means that it has a wider scope than the present paper. 
 




Figure 4 – Sequence of the qualitative data collection and analysis (partly based on Spradley, 1980). 
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Appendix II – Factor analysis results 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the four items44 that are used to measure European identity 
could indeed be divided into two distinct factors, also when similar measurements for national 
identification were included in the analysis. The results of this factor analysis are provided in Table 2 
below and graphically displayed in Figure 5. The two ‘emotional’ items taken to measure the cultural 
component of European identification form one dimension with high factor loadings, while the two 
‘instrumental’ items, used to measure a civic sense of Europeanness show high factor loadings on the 
second dimension. 
 
Table 2 - Factor analysis of civic and cultural scale items: principal axis factoring, oblique rotation (missing 
listwise). 
 h2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Membership a good/bad thing 0.640 0.791 -0.031 
Country benefits from EU 0.601 0.777 0.041 
Feeling attached to Europe 0.563 -0.034 0.768 
Proud to be European 0.607 0.045 0.754 
Source: pooled Eurobarometer data (2001-2007) 
 
The items in both resulting scales correlated significantly with sufficient strength at 0.585 for the 
cultural and 0.637 for the civic scale. Both scales also proved to be internally consisted, with reliability 
statistics (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.737 for the cultural and 0.734 for the civic scale. The two scales are 
significantly and positively correlated amongst each other (0.339, p < 0.01), which is not very surprising; 
people feeling more emotionally attached to Europe can be expected to support its political and 
economic integration as well. 
 







                                                             
1 Throughout this paper, I will use the words ‘identity’ and ‘identification’ interchangeably for stylistic 
considerations. In all cases, however, it refers to the social interaction and process of negotiation; to the verb 
rather than the noun (see Jenkins, 2004, p. 5; Mach, 1993b, p. 6). 
2 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
3 Standard Eurobarometer 68.0 (Fieldwork between September and November 2007). 
4 The highest rates of opposition were found in the United Kingdom (28% opposition vs. 34% support), Austria 
(26% vs. 38%) and Finland (21% vs. 45%). Relatively high levels of support were particularly visible in 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Poland and Romania (all over 70% support). 
5 This ‘democratic deficit’ remains, even though the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, explicitly affirms the 
Union’s intention to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizen” (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2002, p. 10). 
6 Such statements had been made earlier in official documents in 1992 (in the Maastricht Treaty; see Delgado-
Moreira, 1997) and 1973 (in the Copenhagen Declaration; see Ralph Grillo, 2007, p. 69). 
7 Both of which are nation-states that, interestingly, are often assumed to have a social relevance at higher levels of 
abstraction (i.e. vis-à-vis Europe) than most other nation-states. Furthermore, for political and historical reasons, 
the relevance of either the USA and/or Russia as a European ‘Other’ is likely to depend also on the part of Europe 
that is under examination (i.e. Eastern, Central, or Western Europe). 
8 The exact question wording in Eurobarometer 64 was: “In the near future, do you see yourself as being 
(nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality) or just European?” (European 
Communities, 2005, p. 31). The bracketed part “(nationality)” was of course replaced by the appropriate adjective 
(e.g. ‘British’) in the actual survey interview, and the questions were translated to the respondent’s native 
language. 
9 Combining the categories “nationality only” (41%) and “nationality and European” (48%). Note that “nationality 
and European” was the most popular category if Europe is to be seen as a whole. The exact extent to which people 
feel European is of course impossible to derive from this particular survey data. In a longitudinal perspective, this 
answering category is almost always more popular than the “nationality only” option (European Commission, 
2006, p. 45). 
10 Combining the categories “European and nationality” (7%) and “European only” (2%). 
11 Against 28% who did not feel proud to be European. 
12 A note should be made of the fact that his sample was somewhat skewed toward a younger age, and that people 
were recruited among students and in universities (Bruter, 2004, pp. 24-25, 38). Both aspects arguably have their 
impact on Bruter’s findings. However, it is the process that is under analysis, rather than the extent to which these 
findings can be generalized to a broader population. Furthermore, this selection bears a close resemblance to my 
own selection of informants for the qualitative data. 
13 Combining quantitative and qualitative research strategies is still quite rare in the social sciences.  This is a pity, 
because the application of mixed methods has a great potential for discovering new ways of understanding social 
phenomena (see, among others Sosulski & Lawrence, 2008). 
14 Eurobarometers have been conducted since the 1970’s, but the EU’s ‘new’ member states in Central and Eastern 
Europe have only been surveyed since 2001, in an initially separate project called Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer. As of the Eurobarometer number 62.0 (October-November 2004), these countries were included 
in the regular surveys. On theoretical (EU membership) and pragmatic (availability of data in all years) grounds, I 
decided to drop Turkey, Macedonia, and Croatia from my analyses. This resulted in an of a total number of 
122,484 respondents in the analyses, distributed across 29 geographical units. In sum, there are 27 countries 
included in the analysis. However, Northern Ireland is taken separately from the rest of the UK, and Germany is 
split up between East and West Germany, because of different historical and economic backgrounds. 
15 There are a few exceptions to this approximate number based on population size: Germany (East and West) and 
the UK have larger samples, while Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta have smaller sample sizes per data set. 
16 Since identification is by definition contextual, one might ask whether it can be ‘measured’ in the first place. 
After all, does an individual identify with a social group or construct if this identification is not relevant at the time 
of measurement? In other words: should we take our respondents to China before asking them about their 
European identity? 
18 Attachment to Europe and pride of being European for the cultural identification scale, and country has(/not) 
benefited and good/bad thing that the respondent’s country is an EU member-state for the civic identity scale. 
20 A correlation of at least 0.6 was the threshold adhered to. 
21 Cronbach’s alpha was 0.729 for the civic scale, and 0.738 for the cultural scale. 
22 A former member of the Sejm. 
23 Not in the last place through mobility programmes such as Socrates/Erasmus and European Voluntary Service (see 
European Commission, 2007a). 
27 The data and graphs for other countries are available on request. 
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28 The only other three countries that showed a higher level of cultural identification than civic identification were 
Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 
29 I checked whether including either of the two national identity variables separately had any different result, but 
in both cases the effect of age reversed. This reversal seems to indicate a strong relation between age and national 
identification. Intermediate regression models are available from the author on request. 
30 Unravelling this relationship in detail would require a dedicated study and is beyond the scope of the current 
paper. 
32 Even though these studies often did not yet include the ‘new’ EU member-states. Moreover, older studies most 
often focused on the civic identity component rather than the cultural component. 
34 I.e. in country X, national identity has a different impact on European identity than in country Y. 
36 Moreover, the small change in -2 log likelihood of this final regression model is not a significant improvement 
upon the prior model. This implies that taking into account whether a country is a former USSR territory or 
satellite state does not significantly improve how well the model explains the variance of the dependent variable. 
39 It should be pointed out that in this excerpt, Teresa was trying to get her point across and was deliberately 
exaggerating the ‘average’ response of the ‘people on the street’. It does not necessarily reflect her own opinion 
completely. Furthermore, when she said “[...] we are on that side of Eastern Europe [...]”, she pointed to the 
left/western side on a map that I had brought. 
44 Attachment to Europe and pride of being European for the cultural identification scale, and country has(/not) 
benefited and good/bad thing that the respondent’s country is an EU member-state for the civic scale. 
